



GOMUN 2025 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT

Study Guide

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Anna Rudovská and Lucie Teuberová

Released October 2025, 1st Edition

COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to GOMUN 25 and to the Disarmament and International Security Committee. We are thrilled to have you with us for what promises to be a fruitful debate!

As the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, DISEC deals with disarmament, the regulation of armaments, and promoting international cooperation on global security issues.

This year, we turn our attention to Private Military Companies (PMCs) — private actors with increasing involvement in conflict zones. Their growing presence raises serious concerns about accountability, legality, and state sovereignty.

With no binding global standards currently in place, the current situation highlights the importance of establishing a platform for resolving this issue — positioning DISEC as the most appropriate body for states to explore how PMCs can be regulated and brought in line with international law.

We hope this topic will challenge you to think critically about modern warfare and the role of private actors in global peace.

Warm regards,

Anna Rudovská & Lucie Teuberová
Chairs of DISEC, GOMUN 25

First topic: Private Military Companies: The Need for Global Regulation

Anna Rudovská

TOPIC INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, Private Military Companies (PMCs) have become a powerful and controversial presence in modern warfare. Once limited to support roles and security services, these companies now operate in open conflict zones around the world, providing security, combat assistance, military training, and logistical support. While PMCs offer efficiency and flexibility, their growing involvement in armed conflicts has raised serious concerns about accountability, human rights, and the erosion of state sovereignty.

The absence of a unified international legal framework allows PMCs to operate in a grey zone — crossing borders, working for both governments and private clients, and acting beyond consistent regulation, often without ever being held accountable. This overview explores the historical development of PMCs, how their role has evolved, and the current challenges posed by their widespread and largely unregulated use.

KEY TERMS

Private Military Company (PMC) – A private business that provides military or security services. PMCs can be hired by governments, corporations, or international organizations to perform tasks such as armed protection, logistics, training, and even combat support. Unlike national armed forces, PMCs operate for profit and often in areas with limited legal oversight, raising concerns over their accountability and legality.

Private Security Company (PSC) – A private company that provides security services such as guarding facilities, protecting personnel, or managing site surveillance. Unlike PMCs, PSCs typically do not participate in combat or operate

in active conflict zones. While some overlap exists between PMCs and PSCs, **this study guide and committee focus is set only on Private Military Companies.**

Mercenary – An individual who takes part in an armed conflict primarily for personal gain, without being part of a state's official military. While similar to PMC employees, mercenaries are typically hired directly for combat. International law, such as the UN Mercenary Convention, generally prohibits the use of mercenaries, but defining and proving mercenary activity is a difficult endeavor.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) – A set of rules that apply during armed conflict, aiming to protect people who are not participating in hostilities (e.g., civilians) and to restrict the means and methods of warfare. Also known as the laws of war, IHL becomes complicated when PMCs are involved, as their legal status may be unclear under these rules.

Accountability – The concept that individuals and organizations must be held responsible for their actions, especially when those actions result in harm or violations of the law. One of the main concerns about PMCs is the lack of mechanisms to ensure they are legally accountable when abuses occur.

Wagner Group (Russia) A Russian private military company active in Ukraine, Syria, and multiple African nations. Though officially unaffiliated with the Russian government, it is widely recognized as operating in line with Kremlin interests, often described as a “shadow army” for its deniable yet strategic role in Russian foreign policy. The group has been accused of serious human rights abuses and is frequently cited as a leading example of why stronger international regulation of PMCs is urgently needed.

Blackwater / Academi (USA) – One of the most well-known PMCs, involved in the Iraq War and infamous for the 2007 Nisour Square massacre. Now rebranded and merged into Constellis. A key example of PMC accountability challenges.

STTEP (South Africa) – A military consultancy with roots in Executive Outcomes, previously active in Nigeria. Reflects South Africa's long history with PMCs and private military operations.

Sovereignty – The principle that each state has authority over its own territory and affairs without external interference. PMCs operating in foreign countries can sometimes challenge this principle, especially when not under the host nation's control.

Jurisdiction – The legal authority a state has to make and enforce laws. Because PMCs often operate across borders, it's unclear which country has jurisdiction when laws are broken — the hiring state, the home state of the company, or the state where the violation occurred.

Overview of the Topic

Historical Background

The presence of private actors in warfare has existed for centuries, but the rise of modern PMCs began during the Cold War. With the end of large-scale interstate wars and the downsizing of national militaries, many states found themselves needing military support without the political or financial costs of deploying national troops. At the same time, growing instability in regions like Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe created a demand for security and logistical support — a gap that PMCs quickly helped to fill.

The 1991 Gulf War marked the increasing reliance on PMCs, with one contractor for every fifty U.S. soldiers. In the 1990s, South Africa's PMC **Executive Outcomes** gained notice for its involvement in conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone, operating with significant autonomy and success but also raising concerns about the use of force by non-state actors. By the Iraq War (2003–2011), the role of PMCs had expanded dramatically — the ratio of contractors to soldiers rose sharply, and by the mid-2000s their numbers in Iraq rivaled those of U.S. troops, with estimates ranging from 100,000 to nearly 180,000. Major firms included **Blackwater**, **DynCorp**, **KBR**, **MPRI**, and **CACI**, which provided security for officials and convoys, training for local forces, translation, and construction services. In the 2000s, American PMCs like Blackwater also played a central role in Afghanistan, performing not only protective duties but at times engaging in combat-related operations. The 2007 Nisour Square massacre, in which Blackwater contractors

killed 17 Iraqi civilians, sparked international outrage and intensified debates over accountability and the need for global directive.

Since the early 2000s, PMCs have become deeply embedded in global conflict dynamics. They are often contracted not just for support, but for sensitive or high-risk operations traditionally reserved for national armed forces. Many governments now rely on PMCs to provide services such as guarding embassies, training foreign militaries, securing resource extraction sites, and even participating in direct combat.

A particularly influential example is the Wagner Group, a Russian-linked PMC active in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and several African nations. Wagner's operations are frequently aligned with Russian foreign policy interests and have been associated with severe human rights abuses, political destabilization, and the exploitation of natural resources. The shadowy structure of PMCs like Wagner makes it difficult to hold either the company or its backers legally accountable.

Other countries — such as China, Turkey, and Gulf states — have also begun expanding the reach of PMCs to protect commercial interests, support allies, or gain military influence abroad. This growing reliance on private forces reflects a broader trend of privatized warfare that complicates international law and weakens transparency.

The Current State of the Issue

Despite the increasingly prominent role of PMCs in global conflicts, there is no binding international framework governing their behavior. Most efforts to regulate PMCs — such as the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct (ICoC) — are voluntary and lack enforcement mechanisms. As a result, accountability for misconduct remains rare, and the line between state and private military action continues to blur.

Several key challenges define the current debate:

- Lack of international consensus on the legal status and obligations of PMCs;
- Unaccountability in cases of human rights violations and war crimes;

- Difficulty assigning responsibility between hiring states, host states, and the companies themselves;
- Use of PMCs to bypass political scrutiny or legal constraints on state use of force.

As the global demand for security services continues to grow — particularly in unstable or resource-rich regions — PMCs are becoming more powerful and influential. Without strong, enforceable international regulation, their unchecked expansion could lead to further conflict, erode state sovereignty, and undermine international humanitarian law.

Timeline of the Topic

1989 – The UN Mercenary Convention (International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries) is adopted (entered into force in 2001). Although not directly addressing PMCs, it lays the groundwork for future discussions on private actors in armed conflict.

1995 – Executive Outcomes, a South African PMC, plays a major role in ending the civil war in Sierra Leone and gains prominence in Angola. This event brings international attention to the effectiveness — and controversy — of PMCs in internal conflicts.

1997 – The Foreign Military Assistance Act was passed in South Africa, one of the first national laws aimed at regulating private military companies.

2003–2011 – The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq sees unprecedented use of PMCs such as Blackwater, DynCorp, and Triple Canopy. Contractors are involved in direct combat, protection, and logistical operations.

2007 – The Nisour Square massacre occurs in Baghdad, where Blackwater contractors kill 17 Iraqi civilians. This becomes a turning point in the global conversation about the accountability of PMCs.

2008 – The Montreux Document is published by Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It outlines legal obligations and good practices for states related to PMCs, but it is non-binding.

2010 – 2010 – The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) is launched, creating a voluntary standard for conduct in conflict zones. (Although aimed primarily at private security firms, the ICoC overlaps with the activities of PMCs and is often referenced in debates about their regulation.)

2014–present – The Wagner Group, becomes active in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and multiple African countries.

2016 – UN Working Group on Mercenaries begins calling for stronger binding frameworks to regulate PMCs globally, citing increased human rights concerns.

2020's – PMCs are used in conflicts in Mali, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Ukraine, with groups like Wagner accused of destabilizing governments and violating international humanitarian law.

2023 – Following the Wagner Group's short-lived rebellion in Russia and continued operations in Africa, calls for international regulation of PMCs intensify, especially within the UN Human Rights Council.

Past Actions

UN Mercenary Convention (1989) – Adopted by the UN General Assembly, this treaty bans the recruitment, use, financing, and training of mercenaries. Its narrow legal definition, however, excludes most modern PMCs, limiting its practical relevance. Major PMC-operating states such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia have not ratified the treaty, arguing that it does not adequately address contemporary private military companies.

Montreux Document (2008) – A non-binding initiative led by Switzerland and the ICRC that outlines states' existing legal obligations under international law and provides best practices for regulating PMCs. It has been endorsed by more than

50 states, as well as organizations such as the EU and NATO, but it carries no enforcement mechanism.

International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) – 2010 – A voluntary code establishing principles for responsible conduct by private security companies, particularly regarding human rights and the use of force. Supported by states such as the U.S., UK, and Switzerland, it is overseen by the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA). However, compliance remains voluntary, and many major security contractors in active conflict zones are not participants.

United Nations Human Rights Council – Through its Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, the UN has repeatedly called for a binding international framework on PMCs. Political disagreement among member states has prevented progress beyond voluntary guidelines.

NGOs and Media – Investigative groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented abuses by PMCs such as Wagner and Blackwater. Media exposure of incidents like the Nisour Square shooting and Wagner's activities in Africa has increased public scrutiny but has not led to systematic legal reform.

Country positions

United States

One of the largest employers of PMCs worldwide, with firms such as Blackwater and DynCorp heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. generally supports voluntary initiatives like the ICoCA but resists binding international regulation, emphasizing national oversight and contractual accountability instead.

Russia

Relies heavily on the Wagner Group to exert influence abroad, especially in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. While these groups operate in line with Russian state interests, the government denies any formal connection. Russia has not established domestic regulation for PMCs and generally resists international initiatives that would restrict their use.

China

Employs PMCs mainly to safeguard infrastructure linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, a global development strategy launched in 2013 to expand trade routes and build ports, railways, and energy projects across Asia, Africa, and beyond. Chinese firms operate in legal grey areas but are generally less combat-oriented than Western or Russian counterparts. China remains skeptical of binding international regulation, emphasizing sovereignty and preferring state-led control over PMC activity.

France

Does not rely on PMCs for combat but supports the Montreux Document and wider international discussions on accountability. France generally favours the development of clearer norms for PMC conduct while prioritizing state-led military operations, and it may resist proposals seen as overly restrictive or limiting national sovereignty.

United Kingdom

Home to several major PMCs and private security firms. The UK supports soft-law mechanisms such as the ICoCA and Montreux Document but has not endorsed a binding international framework. Its position balances accountability with preserving flexibility in military operations.

Israel

Hosts a growing private security sector, though it rarely uses PMCs for direct combat. Israel's primary concern is national security and counterterrorism. While it supports regulated professionalism in the private sector, it is cautious about restrictions that could limit strategic autonomy.

Iran

Opposes foreign PMCs, especially those tied to Western or regional rivals. Iran has accused PMCs of destabilizing the Middle East. It supports stricter regulation but mainly as a political tool against perceived foreign interference.

Ukraine

Actively calls for stronger international regulation due to Wagner Group's involvement in the ongoing conflict. Ukraine supports legal accountability for PMCs and is likely to back a binding framework under international law.

South Africa

One of the few countries with dedicated PMC legislation: the Foreign Military Assistance Act. South Africa supports multilateral dialogue and endorsed the Montreux Document. Its laws restrict PMC activities but are difficult to enforce abroad.

Nigeria

Has used PMCs like STTEP to combat Boko Haram. While this led to short-term success, it sparked legal and ethical concerns. Nigeria favors international oversight but faces challenges enforcing regulation domestically.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

- *What status should PMCs have under international law, and should they be clearly distinguished from mercenaries or private security companies?*
- *How can the international community ensure accountability and transparency in PMC operations, especially across borders?*
- *Should there be a global registry or licensing system for PMCs, and if so, which body should oversee it?*
- *What limits, if any, should be placed on the use of PMCs in armed conflicts, peacekeeping missions, or intelligence work?*
- *How can states prevent PMCs from undermining national sovereignty or violating international humanitarian and human rights law?*
- *What role should existing frameworks like the Montreux Document or ICoCA play in future regulation?*
- *How can developing countries strengthen their ability to monitor and control PMC activities within their territories?*

Conclusion

The growing presence of Private Military Companies in modern conflicts presents both opportunities and risks. While PMCs can enhance operational capacity, their activities often unfold in legal grey zones, challenging international norms and raising pressing questions about accountability, sovereignty, and human rights.

As this issue becomes more urgent, DISEC delegates must not only understand the evolving role of PMCs but also work toward shaping effective international responses. Striking a balance between the advantages of private security and the need for robust, enforceable regulation will require cooperation, innovation, and a firm commitment to upholding humanitarian law and global security standards.

As DISEC, it is our responsibility to lead in advancing clear frameworks and global norms that ensure security without sacrificing accountability.

Bibliography / References

1. Encyclopaedia Britannica. *Private military firm*. In *Britannica.com*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/private-military-firm>
2. EBSCO Research Starters. *Private military companies*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/military-history-and-science/private-military-companies>
3. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). *International humanitarian law*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law>
4. United Nations. (2008). *The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict*. UN Digital Library. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/644791>
5. Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. *Private military and security companies: Overview*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/our-projects/strategic-programmes/private-military-security-companies>
6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). *Private military and security companies*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from

- <https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-and-security-programme/private-military-and-security-companies>
7. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). (2021, October 6). *What are mercenaries and are they legal?* Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-mercenaries-and-are-they-legal>
 8. Global Policy Forum. *Regulation of private military and security companies*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/dark-side-of-natural-resources/private-military-and-security-companies.html>
 9. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. *Working Group on the use of mercenaries*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/wg-mercenaries>
 10. International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA). *International Code of Conduct Association*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://icoca.ch>
 11. Human Rights Watch. *Accountability for private military and security companies*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.hrw.org>
 12. Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). *Center for Civilians in Conflict*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://civiliansinconflict.org>
 13. BBC News. (2022, April 7). *What are PMCs and why are they controversial?* Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877>
 14. Al Jazeera. (2023, August 20). *The global reach of private military companies*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.aljazeera.com>
 15. The Guardian. *Blackwater and the Iraq War*. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/blackwater>

Second topic: The Role of AI in Crime Prevention and Smart Prisons: Risks and Benefits

Lucie Teuberová

TOPIC INTRODUCTION

Artificial intelligence (AI) is revolutionizing crime prevention and prison management, leading to the emergence of “smart prisons.” AI-powered tools such as predictive analytics, automated surveillance, and risk assessment models are being used to enhance security, prevent violence, and improve rehabilitation efforts. These technologies promise increased efficiency in criminal justice while reducing human error.

However, the growing reliance on AI raises concerns about privacy, algorithmic bias, and ethical implications in law enforcement and incarceration. Questions remain about the transparency and accountability of AI-driven decisions. As governments and institutions implement AI in justice systems, it is crucial to strike a balance between security, human rights, and fairness in order to prevent potential misuse.

KEY TERMS

Artificial intelligence

The crucial term linked to the topic that describes technology which simulates human comprehension and learning, making decisions or solving problems in machine or computer systems. Powered by this technology, they can learn new information, identify objects and patterns and from the data given, they are able to generate detailed recommendations or suggestions to users. It offers numerous opportunities and benefits to the users, such as automation of repetitive tasks, consistency or absolute availability, which humans cannot achieve simply due to

their nature.

Smart Prison

Facilities that use digital technology, artificial intelligence or any other modern smart technology in order to ensure higher safety and security. The implementation can include not only digital advancement, but also for example “smart designs” of the prisons, for which are typical architectural improvements implemented to make the monitoring of the imprisoned easier and more.

Predictive analytics

Using data for machine learning, particularly in terms of artificial intelligence to forecast future outcomes based on datasets, from which the computer learns and derives information. Artificial intelligence analyses patterns to predict and try to foresee the most probable

Automated surveillance

A systematic observation of people, their behaviour or simply monitoring changes and deviations by modern technologies, such as artificial intelligence or automated sensors. It can be used for data collection, analysis, alerts, etc. Its main benefits are efficiency and ability to work with data on a bigger scale, that would be impossible to do manually.

AI risk management

AI risk management is a combination of systematical identifying, mitigating and addressing the potential risks that come with implementing AI technologies. It involves a combination of principles, whose main goal is to minimize the potential negative impacts while maximizing benefits of any technology that is powered by artificial intelligence.

Overview of the topic

One of the greatest challenges the implementation of artificial intelligence in judicial and criminal justice systems poses are certainly concerns about ethical bias, or bias in general.

There are many risks that come with implementation of AI, such as data leakage, data tampering, data poisoning, model drift, legal risks, etc. Therefore, artificial intelligence in this matter poses a significant threat to the privacy of individuals, companies, governing bodies or any other user. Securing privacy is essential to provide a solution to this issue.

Bias

Datasets that are used for teaching artificial intelligence are likely to increase the bias in terms of racism, gender, politics or socioeconomic status, which is a violation of human rights and is not to be tolerated in the use of artificial intelligence by governments or institutions that are linked to the governing bodies. The issue is that the datasets used contain historical bias, or just mildly insufficient or misleading information, which can AI later misuse while generating data for the decision purposes.

Prompt usage

The analysis and answer of artificial intelligence models is heavily influenced by the phrasing and the prompt used to describe the issue. What brings the risk in this issue is a so-called "prompt injection", which triggers outputs that are misleading, inaccurate or even false. This can go hand in hand with compromised datasets, which as mentioned above, can be easily manipulated to answer questions differently.

Data leakage

The leakage of sensitive information from datasets is a significant factor that cannot be overlooked especially in the context of smart prisons and usage of artificial intelligence in this field. It can occur for example when the test data from the used dataset influences the model and shapes it in a way that the sensitive

data and information used to teach the artificial intelligence appear in its answers. That can end up exposing private information, conversations, financial records or other sensitive data.

Challenges of smart prisons

- High cost of smart technology, often causing the implementation unaffordable and unreachable
- Aging of outdated facilities and incompatibility of existing buildings with smart technologies
- Lack of regulatory policy and local standards for smart technology
- Environmental concerns
- Organization of continuous addition of prisoners as well as maintaining the conductivity of the prison
- Lack of competent staff for maintenance
- Controversy of smart technology
- Changing behaviour and preparing prisoners before their release

Public opinion

Generally, trust and confidence in AI-assisted judicial decision-making depends on fairness and unbiased transparent work. Citizens are more likely to trust AI systems when they are given clear explanations of how decisions are made. Ensuring that individuals have the right to challenge AI-driven rulings is an important safeguard against unfair outcomes.

Timeline of the topic

1950 - The father of computer science Alan Turing publishes his paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence." in which he raises the infamous question: "Can machines think?"

1956 - The first ever AI conference takes place at Dartmouth College.

2004 - John McCarthy writes a paper headlined "What Is Artificial Intelligence?"

and proposes today's definition of AI.

2019 - China uses AI assistive tech on court trial for first time.

2022 - A rise in large language models such as OpenAI's ChatGPT. A huge change in performance of AI and its potential.

2024 - Models that can take multiple types of data are able to provide richer experiences. They bring together for example computer vision image recognition and speech recognition capabilities. Also, some national justice ministries (for example France, UK, USA) publish AI action plans, mostly oriented at courts.

2025 - generally, there has been growing pushback action reported, particularly for privacy concerns and other security reasons. Although AI still remains a rapidly growing industry that is attractive more than ever and is being implemented in numerous fields.

Past Action

Examples of global AI laws

UNESCO (November 2021) - *Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence*;

UN (September 2022) - *Principles for the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence in the United Nations System*; privacy, safety, accountability

European Commission (August 2024) *The AI act*

However, the majority of the laws introduced throughout the history of implementing artificial intelligence are non-binding, therefore no nation should be penalized for not enforcing them.

Examples of organizations

ICRAI - (International Conference on Robotics and Automation in Industry)

IEEE - (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)

UNICRI (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute)

Country Positions

France - In October 2024, the number of imprisoned individuals in France was the highest of all of Europe - that is one of the reasons France highly considers implementing smart prison technologies as a part of their mission to combat crime.

Now in 2025, The French Ministry of Justice proposed a pragmatic approach to artificial intelligence technologies in prisons and criminal justice, including for example the implementation of an AI assistant dedicated to all magistrates and agents of the Ministry of Justice, who is secure and sovereign, for integrating search or writing and transcription functions, as well as an AI Observatory who would be responsible for the support of the integration strategy and most importantly ensuring ethical monitoring of uses, as France approaches this topic chiefly with emphasis on ethics and data protection.

Iran - In contrast with the superpowers, Iran strives to explore the usage of AI, particularly its facial recognition technology, in order to monitor its citizens who abuse the Iranian law - mainly targeted at women as a form of social control. The example for this would be the "hijab law" (Iran considers this the Article 368 of its Islamic penal code). This harsh enforcement pushes the Iranian police to create and strengthen systems with artificial intelligence technology to identify the behaviour violating this law.

In the beginning of this year, the Iranian state media reported that cameras would be installed in public places to help identify women who violate Article 368 and therefore automatically face the risk of imprisonment.

People's Republic of China - China's history with artificial intelligence in the judicial and crime prevention field is fairly broad, it has been one of the leaders dominating this industry, and has made many revolutionary steps for the AI

implementation. For example the introduction of the “206 system” in Shanghai - an AI assistant that helps the judges during trials.

China’s smart prison and automated surveillance deployments have faced some controversies, particularly in privacy and security - China broadly uses AI CCTV, cell-level monitoring, or blockchain pilots in certain provinces. For example in 2021, in the Chinese province Jiangsu, there was applied blockchain technology in prison management for parole, commutation and prisoner assessments.

Russian Federation - In 2017, the leader of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever gains a monopoly in AI will rule the world.” Therefore as expected, today, Russia plans on pursuing implementation of artificial intelligence to various fields, including governmental and judicial.

The Russian state authorities have also used the pandemic as an opportunity to increase reliance on AI systems to track and monitor its citizens, as they used AI technology experimentally in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic, where facial recognition played a crucial role.

They also view the area of artificial intelligence as crucial, particularly for development and strengthening their position among the international relations, as the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China’s improvement in this field skyrockets in the last years.

United Kingdom - The United Kingdom has been working with smart prisons efficiently ever since 2022, as they reportedly helped drive down crime and protect the public. In July 2025, the United Kingdom came up with the AI Action Plan for Justice. Since then, the prison officers use artificial intelligence to stop violence before it breaks out. The key thing for the United Kingdom is putting safety and fairness first, while protecting independence of individuals and striving to build a strong justice system to fight future challenges and adapt quickly along with other great powers.

United States of America - This country is the biggest investor in Artificial intelligence technologies, both in private and government sectors. The US government has implemented AI in the field of criminal justice and various ways, such as in forensic analysis, predictive policing, or the controversial risk assessment.

Some American agencies with law enforcement, correctional, and community supervision responsibilities now use artificial intelligence for biometrics on a daily basis. The government also emphasizes the importance of meeting the standards of accuracy and transparency when implementing artificial intelligence in this field.

Questions a resolution must answer

How to ensure algorithmic transparency and explainability?

What bias mitigating strategies should be implemented?

Should there be any limits regarding regulatory frameworks and accountability?

How to address public trust and legal challenges, considering the risks AI brings?

Should there be globally standardized guides for AI?

Conclusion

When considering implementation of artificial intelligence in criminal justice, it is important to think critically about the many risks that come with it, particularly or generally posing a threat to the privacy of individuals. Therefore, a security and unbiased approach for the public is essential to provide a solution to this issue and to ensure the artificial intelligence is to help people more efficiently.

Bibliography / References

1. Law-AI.org. International AI Institutions. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://law-ai.org/international-ai-institutions/>
2. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CCPCJ/PNI/institutes-UNICRI.html>
3. IEEE. IEEE – Advancing Technology for Humanity. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.ieee.org>
4. Montreal AI Ethics Institute. From Case Law to Code: Evaluating AI's Role in the Justice System. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://montrealethics.ai/from-case-law-to-code-evaluating-ais-role-in-the-justice-system/>
5. Raccomandino, G. Smart Prison and the Future of Dynamic Security with AI. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://raccomandino.medium.com/smart-prison-and-the-future-of-dynamic-security-with-ai-dfe4b2da7afa>
6. Securiti. AI Risk Assessment. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://securiti.ai/ai-risk-assessment/>
7. IBM. Artificial Intelligence. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/artificial-intelligence>
8. Rutgers University, Department of Political Science. UNMA COVID Book. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from https://polisci.rutgers.edu/images/documents/student%20faculty%20publications/UNMA_Covid_Book.pdf
9. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy (OLP). Report Document. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.justice.gov/olp/media/1381796/dl?inline>
10. UK Government. Britain's First Smart Prison to Drive Down Crime. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-s-first-smart-prison-to-drive-down-crime>
11. Ministère de la Justice (France). Remise du rapport sur “L'intelligence artificielle (IA) au service de la justice”. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.justice.gouv.fr/actualites/espace-presse/remise-du-rapport-lintelligence-artificielle-ia-au-service-justice>
12. The Guardian. Iran Deploys Drones to Enforce Hijab Dress Code. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/mar/24/iran-police-women-surveillance-hijab-drones-dress-code-law>
13. Hindustan Times. Iran Proposes Long Jail Terms, AI Surveillance in Harsh New Hijab Law. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from

<https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/iran-proposes-long-jail-terms-ai-surveillance-in-harsh-new-hijab-law-101691190489995.html>

14. UNESCO. Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from <https://www.unesco.org/en/legal-affairs/recommendation-ethics-artificial-intelligence>

This is the end of this document.